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Introduction
Regional unions of states include existing federations and emerging confederations such as the European Union. Both forms of union are characterized by rules that prohibit member states from impeding the movement of factors of production between member states. In other words, they have common internal factor markets.
Usually, member states have retained sufficient sovereignty over public expenditure and tax instruments to allow them to influence, through their policy choices, the distribution of mobile factors within the common market.
The efficiency of policy choices made by states within these unions has been examined extensively using a "fiscal competition" model that, while varying according to the particular application, has certain general features. The model supposes that there are two states, each endowed with a concave production technology with at least two factors of production, identical immobile citizens (workers) and a second factor (capital or labor) that is mobile between states but whose supply to the regional union is fixed. In other words, the union is assumed to have a closed common factor market. States levy a tax on the mobile factor, and sometimes citizens as well, to provide a public good which benefits the immobile citizens. The mobile factor migrates between states to satisfy an equal net return condition. Competitive factor markets are assumed so that each factor receives a monetary reward equal to the value of its marginal product. The mobile factor may, or may not, be owned by domestic citizens (absentee ownership can be allowed).
States choose their policies to maximize a payoff function (often the utility function of the immobile citizens) subject to budget constraints and the mobile factor equal return condition. The structure implies interdependence between the policy choices of the states that is modeled by adopting the Nash equilibrium concept. The policies chosen by states are commonly shown to be inefficient.
Two papers that employ aspects of this general structure are the ones by Wildasin (1991a) and Wellisch and Wildasin (1996) . The first of these supposes a decentralized economy of two states each with two types of labor; one rich immobile group and a group of poor mobile workers who migrate between states to equate per capita utility. Since the total supply of mobile workers is fixed the model is one of a closed common labor market. The rich control the public choice process so that the interests of each jurisdiction are those of the rich class. Further, the rich are altruistic towards the poor and hence each jurisdiction chooses some level of income redistribution in favor of the mobile poor. It is argued that if sub-national governments choose this redistribution the resulting Nash equilibrium is inefficient: redistribution creates fiscal externalities that are ignored by competing jurisdictions.
Various coordination options and central intervention are then examined and shown to be efficiency enhancing. Wellisch and Wildasin (1996) extend this framework in at least two important ways. First, they incorporate internationally mobile capital which migrates between states and the world to satisfy a condition that its net rate of return should equal some given world return. Second, the authors 'open' the common labor market by allowing for the possibility of international migration of the mobile group. This was a major innovation to the general model of common markets within regional unions since, as noted, until then the efficiency of inter-state competition had been examined within the context of models with closed common factor markets. Wellisch and Wildasin again characterize an inefficient Nash equilibrium in which competing sub-national jurisdictions choose their policies for some exogenously determined and arbitrary number of international migrants. It is shown that the optimal tax/subsidy on mobile capital is zero. This mirrors the result in Oates and Schwab (1988) . The authors also examine how the Nash policies are influenced by changes in the arbitrary levels of international migration. They find that more migration always raises social welfare if migrants are net taxpayers and lowers social welfare if the migrants are a net fiscal burden.
A game in which states directly choose the level of immigration is also considered. Rather than model the game explicitly, Wellisch and Wildasin draw conclusions about its possible features by referring to their results on the Nash equilibrium obtained using the assumption of some exogenously given level of migration.
They conclude that if immigrants are net fiscal burdens the Nash equilibrium is one in which there is no international migration. If migrants are net fiscal contributors some positive level of immigration is chosen by jurisdictions. Finally, a "corrected" Nash equilibrium is examined in which a central government provides matching transfers to each jurisdiction (the policy instrument is the matching rate) that take account of the fiscal externalities and achieve an efficient outcome. The authors also note that there is no general existence proof for this class of model though one can construct examples, using specific functional forms, where existence and uniqueness are assured 3 .
Braid (1996) considers a similar model with the addition of an ad valorem, rather than a lump-sum tax, on the mobile factor. He examines only the symmetric Nash equilibrium, one in which all jurisdictions are the same.
His analysis exploits the similarity in equilibrium policy choices to examine the predicted outcome. He also assumes that the factor of production is perfectly, and freely, mobile internationally. It allows him, as it has previous analysts, to assume a constant return to the mobile factor of production.
We develop a model of a regional union in the spirit of the general model discussed above. The model is of a two-state region with free migration of a mobile factor between states. An innovation of the work is to incorporate a separate mobile factor supply condition that also allows the total supply of the mobile factor to the region to vary depending on the payoff it receives within the region relative to the world payoff.
Unlike previous studies, we allow this migration to be imperfect due to migration frictions. Therefore, in equilibrium it is possible for the regional payoff to differ from the world payoff. The migration friction is captured through a parameter , ε, that we take to be a measure of the level of 'integration' between the region and the world. The parameter can vary from zero (a completely isolated region) to infinity (a fully integrated region). Using this basic structure, we are able to develop a game with policies as strategies and characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the total supply of the mobile factor to the region, and its regional distribution, are determined by the competitive tax and expenditure policies of the states.
The first contribution of the paper, though not a direct consequence of the inclusion of the mobile factor supply function, is to provide a general existence proof for a Nash equilibrium. As noted above, no proof of global existence has been developed for this class of models. The existence result is an example of the well-known Gale MasColell Theorem (1975) . It proceeds by transforming the game with policies as strategies into a game with the desired mobile factor supplies as strategies. Existence of equilibrium for this "dual"game is assured by the application of well-known fixed point results. Every choice of mobile factor supply is associated with a "best" feasible policy.
Thus, the existence of an equilibrium in the dual game ensures the existence of an equilibrium in the "primal" game, the one in which the strategies are the states' tax and expenditure policies.
The second result is to show that states have an incentive to choose a non-zero mobile factor tax/subsidy in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the findings in Wellisch and Wildasin, and Oates and Schwab. The non-zero tax/subsidy is a consequence of two factors. The first, that is independent of the degree of integration, is an externality generated by the migrating factor. It tends to make the tax positive or negative (a subsidy) depending on the sign of the externality. The second, which is dependent on the degree of integration as captured by ε, we call a 'hiring cartel' effect. If ε is less than infinite (less than full integration) states have some monopoly power over the mobile factor and the hiring cartel effect has a positive impact on the tax/subsidy. States will wish to use their monopoly power over the mobile factor to tax it and redistribute in favor of immobile domestic labor. Whether states levy a tax or subsidy depends on the interaction between the externality and the hiring cartel effects.
Therefore, the zero mobile factor tax result in previous papers is a special case in our model where the externality is zero and the regional common factor market is fully integrated with the world factor market. Allowing for migration frictions across the common external border, and externalities, one derives the result that states will levy nonzero mobile factor taxes/subsidies.
The third result is to show that the magnitude of the tax/subsidy depends upon the value of ε , the integration parameter. Specifically, higher degrees of integration imply a smaller hiring cartel effect. As states are exposed to more international competition for the mobile factor, their monopoly power diminishes. In the limit, where there is full integration, the tax/subsidy is determined only by the externality.
Finally, we are able to generate some new insights into the efficiency of interstate competition within a regional union. It is important to note here that our treatment of efficiency is somewhat different to the standard one. The usual approach, as discussed in Wellisch (2000) , has been to examine whether public goods are under or over provided by states that tax a mobile factor. Rather than pursue this issue, we choose to examine how the tax/subsidy policy of the states affects efficiency in the regional distribution and total regional supply of the mobile factor. It is shown that if ε is less than infinite, the monoply power of the states, exercised through the (non-zero) tax/subsidy, creates a distortion in the distribution of the mobile factor within the region, and inefficiency in its total supply. The presence of this distortion depends on the states choosing a non-zero tax/subsidy, and this, in itself, is a result of the adoption of our more general factor migration condition with imperfect mobility. In a sense then, we identify a new source of inefficiency associated with policy competition between states. However, in the special case where ε is infinite (full integration), the monopoly power of the states disappears (the tax reflects only the externality) and the Nash equilibrium results in an efficient distribution of the mobile factor and total supply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic set up of the model. Section 3 examines the nature of the Nash equilibrium. It provides the general proof of existence and characterizes the (non-zero) equilibrium choice of the tax/subsidy.
Section 4 examines the effect of greater integration on the tax/subsidy policies adopted by states. In Section 5, the efficiency of these policies is examined while conclusions are presented in Section 6.
The Set Up of the Model
Consider a regional union (a federation or confederation) of two independent states i =1,2 each with a population of immobile residents with such high attachment to place that they never migrate between states, or between the region and the rest of the world 4 . These residents own the land, fixed capital and means of production (firms) in state i, and they each supply one unit of labor. Hence, they can be thought of as domestic workers, capitalists or landowners. From now on we refer to them, for presentational convenience, as homefolks, by virtue of their "stay at home" mentality.
There is also a generic mobile factor of production in state i, which can be thought of as capital, or labor (e.g. guest or itinerant workers). Unlike the homefolks, this factor migrates between states, as well as between the region and the rest of the world. The quantity of the factor present in state i is denoted as i n . Since the number of homefolks (and their labor supply), the quantity of land and the amount of (fixed) capital are given, the strictly quasi concave production function of state i can be written as
Each unit of the mobile factor receives a return, i w , which is equal to the value of its marginal product,
Implicit here is the assumption that there are many firms in each state, and hence, that the market for the mobile factor is perfectly competitive. The homefolks in state i receive the residual from production, which might include rent from any of the fixed factors, or the return to their labor input (this return can be aggregated with rents when homefolk labor is inelastically supplied). The total residual is
The mobile factor has a strictly quasi concave continuous payoff function, Homefolks and the mobile factor contribute to the cost of providing the public good. The per unit contribution of the mobile factor in state i is via the tax/subsidy discussed above. If the tax is positive then the mobile factor makes a financial contribution to the public good but when the tax is negative (a subsidy) the mobile factor benefits from the public good and is provided with a monetary subsidy. The contribution of the homefolks in state i is
Therefore, the total monetary reward to the homefolks in state i, denoted as i i X (n ) , is equal to the residual together with the contribution from the mobile factor (which is positive, zero or negative) less expenditure on the public good,
There are multiple consequences from the inward migration of the mobile factor into any particular state. For example, the homefolks are favored by an increase in the economic residual, since i i R (n ) is increasing in i n . However, there may be broader external benefits and costs from in and out migration of the mobile factor. In the case of migrating labor, immigrants may bring with them cultural ideas that can enhance the quality of life in the host country and skills that add to overall productivity. But the cultural differences can be annoyances to the homefolks and immigration can also cause increased congestion. Also, while imported capital produces higher income for the homefolks, and is a benefit to them, industrialization may strain social cohesion and environmental quality can be compromised by increases in capital intensity.
We capture these benefits and costs with a net externality function, i i E (n ) , where i E , the net externality value in state i, is a strictly quasi concave continuous function of the quantity of the mobile factor present. The homefolks' additively separable pay-off function, i i P (n ) , depends on the monetary reward and the net externality 5
As observed in the introductory comments, federations (at least democratic ones) have common internal markets in which factors of production are free to move between states without artificial restriction. Confederations often also have common internal capital markets and, as with the declared aim of the European Union, an emerging common labor market in which citizenship of one state guarantees region wide citizenship.
To capture this feature of regions, we assume that the two states share a common factor market in which the mobile factor moves without restriction between states to maximize its payoff. As noted earlier, this is a standard way to model common regional factor markets. The implication is that, for a given regional mobile factor supply, if the pay-off is higher in state i than j then the mobile factor will move from j to i. This depresses the return in state i and increases it in state j until payoffs are equal (there are no regional arbitrage opportunities). Therefore, in equilibrium,
Another important feature of regions that share a common factor market between member states, including federations and confederations, is that labor and capital migrate between the region and the rest of the world. There are various ways to capture this process. In many studies, including Oates and Schwab, and Wellisch and Wildasin, the mobile factor equilibrium is achieved when the payoff is the same internally, as it is in the rest of the world. Specified as a condition on relative payoffs, if p* is the world factor payoff, the equilibrium requires p/p* = 1. This equilibrium condition is the result of assumptions, either explicitly or implicitly made; first, that the mobile factor can move costlessly across all borders, and second, the mobile factor is homogeneous, both in its productivity, and regional preferences.
We maintain the productivity homogeneity condition implicit in this approach, but drop the assumption that the mobile factor is alike in all other ways. While movement between states, within the region, is assumed costless, migration in and out of the region may not be costless. Factor owners may have regional preferences. For labor there is a strong pull towards home. Familiar customs, language, as well as a desire for familial propinquity, influence the readiness of labor to migrate. Owners of capital also display an inclination to invest in familiar states. The desire to avoid uncertainties associated with foreign investment is thought to explain the capital market home bias: investors will accept a lower return from investments in their own country than those taken abroad.
The market manifestations of a home bias in both capital and labor markets are equilibria with a difference between regional payoffs and those received in the rest of the world. The potential for differences in tastes for the region, and/or differences in the ease of movement in and out of the region is modeled here as a reservation payoff, denoted as ρ. This is the value of the payoff required by an individual unit of the mobile factor, relative to the world value, to locate within the region rather than outside it. Since the international return is fixed, for convenience, and without loss of generality, it is assumed to be one (p* = 1). With this condition, hence forth, we will be concerned only with the local equilibrium payoff, p. The reservation value is expressed as a locational choice condition: a factor is located in the region if the specific reservation value is no larger than the local payoff: ρ ≤ p. If ρ > p, the factor will either emigrate from or remain out of the region.
It is assumed that ρ is a continuous random variable with a distribution f ( ) ρ .
The proportion of the population of the mobile factor that either remains, or migrates to, the region is
The regional mobile factor supply is thus
where N is the world supply.
The regional mobile factor supply is potentially a very complicated function of p.
It might depend on the higher order moments of the distribution, as well as its mean. For that reason, it is convenient for purposes of analysis to choose a one-parameter distribution. The Weibull distribution is often employed in the analysis of extreme values. If ρ is distributed as Weibull, the regional mobile factor supply function is
While not strictly an elasticity, in the common use of the term, ε performs much the same function: the supply response to changes in the relative payoffs, depends on ε.
The response is not proportional to it, as it is with a true elasticity, but it nonetheless varies positively with ε. We also think of the elasticity parameter ε as a measure of the degree of integration between the region's market for the mobile factor, and the world market. In this scheme, 0 ε = implies no integration, 0 < ε < ∞ implies partial integration while ε = ∞ indicates full integration (the factor is perfectly mobile between the region and the world).
In the discussion in Section 4, we will examine two polar cases; ε = 0 and ε = ∞.
For ε = 0, the mobile factor does not move in or out of the region and from (10) it can be seen that total regional supply of the mobile factor is fixed at ) e 1 ( N α − −
. The parameter α is determined by the relative size of the regional population. A small value of α is consistent with the assumption that the region is small compared to the rest of the world (and vice versa). For ε = ∞, the entire mass of the distribution is concentrated at ρ = 1.
This means that if p is smaller than 1, the region is denuded entirely of population, and if p is larger than one, the entire world resides in the region. In this regard, the parameter ε is similar to the common supply elasticity. As will be discussed later, when ε = ∞, the only equilibrium is one in which the regional mobile factor payoff is equal to the given world payoff (as discussed, this is assumed to be one). This, in turn, implies that the total regional supply of the mobile factor is fixed at ) e 1 ( N α − − when ε is infinite.
The Nature of an Equilibrium
We now characterize an equilibrium where it is supposed that the government of state i is elected by the homefolks who maintain a numerical majority. 6 Therefore, the interests of state i are synonymous with those of the homefolks and i i q and t are chosen by state i to maximize i P , as defined by (6). There are two types of policy choice interdependencies between states. First, through the internal equilibrium condition (7) the policies of state i affect its own mobile factor supply i n and the mobile factor supply in state j (i.e. j n ). Since state j's net income and mobile factor externality are functions of j n this means that state i's policies affect the welfare of the homefolks in state j. Thus, the model captures the direct effect that independent policies in a regional union of states have on one another. Second, because state policies also affect the total supply of the mobile factor through (10) there is an additional source of interdependence.
Interdependence raises the prospect that states will act strategically. To capture this, we suppose that when making policy choices, states take as given the policies of the other states (Nash behavioral conjectures). However, each state is assumed to assess (accurately) the impact of its policies on the supply of the mobile factor within its own borders, conditional on the (supposed) fixed value of the other state's policies. The state takes account of these mobile factor supply changes in so far as they affect the well being of the state's homefolks. In other words, each state within the region pursues its own selfinterest and ignores the broader regional effects of its policies 7 .
Existence of Equilibrium
Since it makes little sense to analyze the nature of a non-existent outcome, we first examine the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game implicit in the states' policy choices. The difficulty we see for the problem as stated is that the objective functions of the states may not be concave in the strategies.
Therefore, while there may be an optimum for both states, conditional on its neighbor's policy choices, the set of optima may be neither continuous nor convex. While this potential problem does not rule out existence, we are not able to prove that, in general, or for our particular problem, an equilibrium exists in the game described with tax/subsidy and expenditure policies as strategies.
However, we find that we can prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game that is the "dual" of the game in policy strategies. The duality is such that the existence of equilibrium of the dual game, so described, implies existence of a Nash equilibrium of the "primal" game in which the strategies are tax/subsidy and public good provision policies.
We start with the recognition that states, while they can make choices from the entire set of feasible strategies, will choose only those that are least expensive and achieve a desired supply of the mobile factor. While there may be many combinations of taxes and public good levels that will induce a chosen n i , states will choose only that policy combination that has the smallest cost. We show, in what follows, that state specific mobile factor supply is a strictly quasi-concave function of the policy variables.
This being the case, it follows that there is a unique minimum cost combination of public 7 The impact that one state's choice of policy has on another state's welfare is often termed a fiscal externality (see Wildasin (1988) ). Our model set up implies that there is both tax/subsidy and policy competition between states. Wildasin (1988) characterizes equilibria in a fiscal competition model where states have one strategic variable, either public expenditure (a Z equilibrium), or a tax (a T equilibrium).
Further discussion of fiscal competition models with two strategic variables is provided in Wildasin and Wilson (1991) and Wildasin (1991b) .
policies that will produce a give n i response, given the desired level of mobile factor in the neighbor state, n -i . The dual game is the one with desired mobile factor supplies as strategies. We show what restrictions are necessary to insure that the state objective functions are strictly quasi-concave in n i . Since the set of feasible n's is convex, it follows that a Nash equilibrium of the dual game with n's as strategies, exists. Since there is a unique mapping from desired n to state policies, it follows that an equilibrium in the primal policy game exists as well.
In the model structure above, individual states have two policy instruments -a tax, t, and a public good, q 8 . As stated, the tax can be either positive or negative, in which case it is a subsidy. For the discussion of existence, we find it more natural to think of the monetary instrument as a subsidy, s. When s is positive, it enhances the mobile factor's payoff and, when negative, it diminishes it.
There are three fundamental elements of the model developed above:
Mobile factor payoff is a strictly quasi concave continuous function of its income and the public good. Income is the wage, a declining function of mobile factor population, plus the state subsidy,
(ii) A state's mobile factor supply is an increasing function of its own factor payoff.
The internal migration equilibrium condition (7), can be used to derive state-specific mobile factor supply as a function of its policies, conditional on its neighbor's policies,
(iii) The payoff to a state is the sum of two strictly quasi concave functions of i n
less its expenditure on the public good, q, and its subsidy payout (tax collected), s. 
We will use the concavity of i v (.) with constant i n to prove that the function n i ( ) is, itself, strictly quasi concave. For every value of n i , define its upper contour set as
Lemma
The set UC i (n|s -i ,q -i ) is convex.
Proof:
on the boundary of UC i ( n | s -i , q -i ).
Because n i is monotonically The iso cost line is displayed in Fig. 2 , together with the convex iso-n curve from Fig. 1 . The point of tangency between the two yields the combination of policies that achieves i n n = at minimum cost.
Fig. 2: Iso Cost Line and Iso n Curve
The strict quasi concavity of n i (s i ,q i |s -i ,q -i ) means that there is a unique minimum cost policy choice for every value of n i . The efficient input combination (the inputs are the subsidy and public good policies), and thus the minimum cost, depends on the desired factor supply, n -i , of the neighbor. The minimum cost is then a function of the desired choice of each state 10 If q is not produced at a constant marginal cost, and it is crowded, its per unit factor price would be MC(q)/B(n) where B(n) represents crowding. 
We have now transformed the primal game with policy choices as strategies to its dual in which the quantity of the mobile factor is the strategic variable for state i. In a sense, the transformation restricts the original strategy set of policy variables to be only those that produce the target level of factor supply at minimum cost. This is a plausible restriction since it is always in a state's interests to make cost minimizing choices in order to maximize the payoff to citizens. The set of possible choices of n , Ω , is convex and bounded. Where N is the world mobile factor population,
In the dual game, the objective of each state is a function of i n alone
A Nash equilibrium,
(n , n ) − ∈ Ω× Ω , is defined in the usual way, namely,
Theorem (Existence): If C i (n i , n -i ) is a convex function of n i , a Nash equilibrium to the policy game exists.
Proof: Since i (.) Π is strictly quasi concave, the convexity of C i (.) implies that each state's objective function P i (n i |n -i ) is continuous and quasi concave. This game is played by the choice of n from a compact convex set to maximize a strictly quasi-concave objective function. This is sufficient for the existence of a Nash equilibrium 11 [see Rosen It is well known that with constant prices, the cost function is convex if n i (.) is strictly quasi concave. In the case here, even though i n (.) is strictly concave in i s and i q , the price of the public good declines with i n . Thus, as a state moves from an equilibrium at * * i i q ,s (Fig. 2) and achieves a higher value of i n , the slope of the iso-cost line changes in such a way that reduces the relative price of using the public good versus the subsidy. As the size of the mobile factor population increases, there will be a tendency for states to substitute public goods for subsidies, or decreasing taxes. With a sufficient mobile factor response to increases in public good supply, the cost function may not be convex.
Nevertheless, a Nash equilibrium may still exist, even if the cost function is not convex. Concavity of the objective function is a sufficient, not a necessary condition for existence. Furthermore, the objective function ) n ( i i Π can be concave in mobile factor supply if the concavity of R i (.) outweighs the non-concavity of -C i (.), that is if
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We have not been able to demonstrate uniqueness in general. However, there is one value of the integration parameter, ε , where it is possible to show that the equilibrium is unique. This is the case where ε is infinite (full integration). In this instance, equilibrium imposes an additional constraint on states in the sense that the mobile factor must receive a monetary return that is exactly equal to the world payoff (assumed to be one). If the regional return to the mobile factor is less than the world return, the entire factor supply will leave. If the regional return is higher, the entire world supply will flow into the region. Thus, as long as the state production functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale, it is impossible for a state to sustain a mobile factor return that is higher or lower than the world value if ε is infinite.
Since there is only one mobile factor supply in each state consistent with the world payoff, there can only be a single Nash equilibrium if ε is infinite. Interestingly, this is the case found in the existing literature. However, for the more general case where ε is less than infinite, and the mobile factor is imperfectly mobile between the region and the world, there may be more than one Nash equilibrium.
Thus, what we have shown is existence and uniqueness for the more usual model where the mobile factor migrates to equate its regional return with the world return, and existence and possible multiple equilibria for the more general case of imperfect integration where the world and regional payoffs diverge. An implication is that it would be extremely difficult to undertake comparative static analysis, except in the polar case of ε = ∞ where we are guaranteed to have both existence and uniqueness.
The Tax/Subsidy
As noted in the Introduction, a major focus of the paper is to examine whether states within regional unions will adopt non-zero tax/subsidy policies towards a factor of production that is perfectly mobile within the region, but imperfectly mobile between the region and the outside world. For this part of our analysis, we find it more convenient to continue developing the model in terms of its primal version, where state i chooses i i t and q to maximize (6), conditional on j j t and q .
Development of the model in this way requires knowledge of the mobile factor supply responses to changes in i i t and q . Since our intention is to examine the Nash equilibrium tax/subsidy, rather than the public good, which we have shown in the discussion of existence to be provided in equilibrium at minimum cost, we need only derive the mobile factor supply responses to changes in i t . They can be found by differentiating (7) and (10) with respect to i t ,
where
In the primal version of the policy game, state i chooses its policies, i t and i q , to maximize (6), subject to its neighbor's policy choices, j j t ,q . With this set up, there are two necessary conditions, one for i t and one for i q , that must be satisfied at any Nash equilibrium. Since our focus is on the tax/subsidy, we only require the necessary condition for i t , namely, 
The first point to note is that, unlike the result obtained in the papers discussed in the Introduction, in general the equilibrium tax/subsidy adopted by state i is non-zero.
The reason for this can be seen if one examines the right hand side of the tax/subsidy expression. The first part,
, is the change in the externality resulting from an increase in the quantity of the mobile factor present in state i. We refer to this from now on as the "marginal externality value". As discussed, this term can be positive, zero or negative in sign. The second part of the equilibrium tax/subsidy, the term ( )
n p w / p (1 bp w ) − , we label the "hiring cartel" component (the rationale for this terminology is given below). We know that b ≥ 0, and that, because of the concavity of the production function, ' j w is non-positive. Therefore, the hiring cartel part is always negative. However, when the minus sign in front of the cartel term is taken into account one can think of the cartel component as non-negative. Thus, the hiring cartel effect tends to make * i t positive.
The hiring cartel component of the tax/subsidy requires further explanation. In this regard, it should be recalled that there are many perfectly competitive firms producing a homogeneous product in both states. As a consequence, the mobile factor is paid a return equal to the value of its marginal product. Were there but one firm, or were firms able to form a statewide hiring cartel, homefolks could improve their position, vis-à-vis the perfectly competitive outcome, by paying the mobile factor something less than its marginal product. A hiring cartel could exploit its monopoly position to the advantage of the firm-owning homefolks.
Clearly, there is no cartel in our model. However, effectively the state government acts in the place of such a cartel -it acts on behalf of homefolks since it represents their interests -and uses its taxing power to exploit the potential monopoly gains and increase the income of the homefolks. The revenue raised from the tax on the mobile factor is redistributed to homefolks via a reduced monetary contribution to the public good (see (4)) and direct monetary awards. The result is that firms and homefolks, through the policies of the government of a state, pay the mobile factor a return that is less than its marginal product. It is for this reason that we have used the words "hiring cartel" to describe this part of the tax/subsidy equation: the state essentially acts as a hiring cartel which has the option of paying the mobile factor something other than its marginal product.
When will states tax the mobile factor and when will they provide it with a subsidy? It is clear that the hiring cartel effect always induces state i to tax the mobile factor, that is, to try to exploit the mobile factor for the advantage of the homefolks. If the marginal externality value is also negative (in the case of labor this might be so if the costs of more guest workers outweighs the benefits) then the tendency to exploit the mobile factor is intensified and the tax is higher than otherwise. However, if the marginal externality value is positive it will tend to offset the desire to exploit the mobile factor. If sufficiently large (and positive), the marginal externality value may encourage a state to provide the mobile factor with a monetary subsidy.
Hence, the model explains the tax/subsidy policies of states as the result of an interaction between the desire to redistribute from mobile factors for the benefit of homefolks and the externalities generated by migrating factors. It also explains differences in the policies adopted by states; specifically, states will have different marginal externality values and different hiring cartel effects, and hence will choose to adopt diverse tax/subsidy policies in equilibrium. For example, a state that perceives that it has a relatively low, though positive, marginal externality value with respect to migrating guest workers may wish to tax them. This might be a state that already has relatively large numbers of guest workers and hence is at a point on its externality function for which the marginal value of extra guest workers is low. Alternatively, a state that is relatively small in terms of mobile population may have a much higher marginal externality value and choose to subsidize mobile labor.
Regional Integration and the Tax/Subsidy
We now examine how the degree of integration between the region's factor market and the world factor market, as captured by the parameter ε, influences the (nonzero) tax/subsidy chosen by a state within a regional union. Since ε also captures the degree of competition faced by the region as a whole in competing internationally for the mobile factor, we can also view this as an analysis of how changing international competition affects the policies of states within the region.
As part of the discussion, it is also possible to consider the impact of withinregion competition (directly between the states). This is an interesting question to ponder because the proponents of competitive federalism, such as Breton (1984) , have argued that competition between states is desirable in the sense that it reduces the taxing power of governments. We tackle this issue by examining what we call the "monopoly state" in which the region consists of only one state.
The analysis is undertaken for two polar cases. In the first, we suppose that the region is fully isolated from the world ( 0 ε = ), while in the second case we suppose that the region is fully integrated ( ε = ∞ ). It has not been possible to obtain analytical results on the intermediate case, where ε is less than infinite, but more than zero, because b is a function of ε and varies in an indeterminate way as ε changes.
Before discussing each case, it is useful to note that, as with the competitive twostate case, a monopoly state chooses its policies to maximize the payoff to the homefolks, but faces only one factor market constraint, specifically, 
There is also a difference between the tax/subsidy expression when state i is a monopoly state, and the tax/subsidy expression if it faces competition for the mobile factor within the region. This can be seen by noting that if a state is a monopoly state its tax/subsidy is * '
Comparing (24) with (22), the equilibrium tax/subsidy for the competitive case, it is clear that the hiring cartel effect differs, depending on whether a state faces competition from within the region.
Now consider the polar case where the region is fully integrated with the world factor market (ε = ∞) and the regional mobile factor payoff is equal to the world payoff.
For the competitive case, we know from the discussion of uniqueness in Section 3.2 that the Nash equilibrium is unique. One can also show that b when = ∞ ε = ∞ . Hence, the hiring cartel effect is zero for both the monopoly and competitive state cases and the tax/subsidy is
Thus, if the region is fully integrated a monopoly state chooses the same tax/subsidy as a competitive state. The implication is that the competitive federalism outcome is no different to the monopoly outcome when the region is fully integrated simply because the monopoly power of the state is completely constrained by foreign competition for the mobile factor. 
Because we do not know whether or not there are multiple Nash equilibria in the interstate policy game, we are unable to compare the monopoly and competitive state outcomes in general. However for the polar cases of ε = ∞, we know that the monopoly and the competitive outcomes are similar. In both cases, the hiring cartel effects go to zero and the tax/subsidy reflects only the externalities. An unambiguous comparison is also possible for the fully isolated region (ε = 0). It is clear, from a comparison of (24) and (26) that for a region of similar size the single state mobile factor tax is higher than the equilibrium value of the competitive state tax. As ε (and thus b) goes to 0 the expression in (24) becomes infinitely large. However, a state cannot tax without limit, and this indicates that the monopoly state tax is fully exploitive: it will equal the full price w(n) paid to the mobile factor. Furthermore, the monopoly state will supply no public good.
However, full exploitation cannot be an equilibrium outcome for the competitive state, as long as the marginal externality is not a large negative value. If one state were to be fully exploitive, its neighbor could induce the entire mobile factor supply into its state and enjoy the returns from it with a small reduction in its tax, or a small increase in its supply of the public good. Since the residual, R, is an increasing function of n it will be in its interest to make the change if the mobile factor-created externality is not negative and large. The implication is that when 0 ε = there is a difference between a competitive federalism outcome and a monopoly outcome, namely, the competitive outcome will involve a lower tax/subsidy on the mobile factor.
This begs the question of what determines the extent to which the competitive state tax is lower than the monopoly tax? In answering this, one might suspect (rightly, as it turns out) that the more competitive is the regional factor market, the smaller is the cartel effect. One can gain some insight here by considering the case of a two state region where both states have the same technology and the equilibrium is one in which each state has half the total mobile factor supply (which does not change since 0 ε = ).
The value of ' w for each state is also the same in the equilibrium. Since each state has the same factor supply, the steeper is the wage function (the larger in absolute value is w') the higher is the equilibrium tax.
At first sight this is curious but it points vividly to the role of intra regional competition in influencing the tax chosen by states. Specifically, we know that the value of the mobile factor response to changes in state taxes in the competitive case is determined by (19). When ε = b = 0, the response in the competitive case is
n / t 1/(w w ) ∂ ∂ = + . Clearly, the larger in absolute value is w', the smaller is the mobile factor loss to a state for any increase in its tax rate. If the marginal value of the wage function is infinitely steep, a state can increase its factor tax with no change in factor supply. The limiting case is similar to the fully isolated single state in which the state possesses a complete monopoly over its own migrating factor. Thus, the magnitude of the difference between the competitive and monopoly mobile factor tax when ε is zero depends on the steepness of the wage functions. Since we take the steepness of the wage function to be a measure of the degree of interdependence, and hence competition between states, the implication is that greater intra regional competition results in a smaller difference between the competitive and monopoly mobile factor tax.
Sub-Optimal Supply and Distribution of the Mobile Factor
We now turn to the final part of the paper, the discussion of efficiency. This issue has been studied extensively in models of regions that levy taxes on mobile factors, for example, the tax competition literature. As noted in the Introduction, the main issue addressed is whether the public good is over or under provided relative to an optimal supply. A comprehensive survey of these ideas, and the main results, can be found in Chapter 4 of Wellisch (2000) .
Rather than follow this path here, we choose to explore a different question: the interaction between migration frictions, as captured by the ε parameter in the mobile factor supply function, and optimality in the inter-state distribution and total supply of the mobile factor. This different emphasis allows us to generate some new insights into the inefficiencies created by competitive state policies (eg., tax competition) which are not directly related to the over or under provision issue.
Inter-State Distribution
The first question, whether a given supply of the mobile factor is allocated efficiently between states, has been studied, though in a somewhat different context to the one here. The approach has been to suppose that a given (rather than variable) supply of a factor, such as labor, migrates between the member states of a federation 12 . The 
Thus, in equilibrium competing states must levy the same per unit tax on the mobile factor for its distribution across states to be efficient. The application of such an "equating at the margin" idea for our model is more complex. First, there is the mobile factor externality to consider. The implication of this is that, for any state i, the marginal benefit of an extra unit of the mobile factor has two components. One is the change in the net externality benefits which result from an additional unit of the mobile factor and the other is the change in the reward to the homefolks. The marginal externality benefit is simply ' i i E (n ) . The change in the reward to the homefolks is just the change in total state output (the marginal product of the mobile factor) less the net payment to the mobile factor. For state i this is
where it should be recalled from our earlier discussion that i i i i
x w (n ) t = − is the net monetary reward accruing to each unit of the mobile factor). As a result, the marginal benefit of an extra unit of the mobile factor in state i is
Efficiency in the inter-state distribution of a given supply of the mobile factor requires an equality of this value across states;
Since the difference between the marginal product and the net monetary reward is equal to the mobile factor tax, the equating at the margin rule in our model can be expressed as
Whether the tax/subsidy policies of the states in the game characterized in Section 3 meet this condition can be determined by substituting the Nash equilibrium expressions for i t and j t (from (22)) into (28). This yields
For the Nash equilibrium tax/subsidy policies to result in an efficient allocation of a given quantity of mobile factor within the region requires that the hiring cartel effects be equal in equilibrium. When ε < ∞ , this requirement is not satisfied, and the Nash equilibrium tax/subsidy policies of the states create an inefficiency in the inter-state distribution of the mobile factor. Clearly, the source of the inefficiency is the hiring cartel effect. The exception is the polar case where ε is infinite. In this case, we know that the hiring cartel effect is zero and that, therefore, (29) must be satisfied.
Thus, if one allows for a divergence in the regional and world payoffs due to imperfect factor mobility, it is clear that the inter-state mobile factor distribution is inefficient if the region is not fully integrated with the world. It is only when there is full integration, the assumption made in the model employed by Oates and Schwab, for example, that the inter-state mobile factor distribution would be efficient. This is because, in such a world, states have no monopoly power over the mobile factor.
However, if there is imperfect integration, states face an incentive to distort the inter-state mobile factor distribution.
Total Regional Supply and Inter-State Distribution
The analysis above was undertaken for a given total supply of the mobile factor and concentrated on the issue of its inter-state distribution. But a feature of our model is that it allows for variable regional mobile factor supply. The issue of whether the total regional supply of the mobile factor is efficient, has received much less attention, possibly because of prior concentration on models in which there is full integration or none at all. For example, the fiscal externality literature referred to above, does not consider this question because it supposes that the supply of the mobile factor within the region (usually a federation) is fixed. However, with a variable total supply of the mobile factor, there is not only the issue of the inter-state distribution of the factor to consider, but also the efficiency of its total supply.
For the total supply of the mobile factor to be efficient also requires that the net marginal benefit of an additional unit of the mobile factor be equal to zero in each state.
If it is not, then one can always change the supply of the mobile factor and increase the payoff to the homefolks in state i. But if the net marginal benefit is zero in each state then (28) must also be satisfied since the net marginal benefits will also be equal across states. Thus, the following condition must be met in equilibrium if the total supply of the mobile factor to the region, and its distribution across states, are to be efficient, Therefore, in a regional union with a variable total factor supply, (30) is the equating at the margin rule that must be satisfied for both the inter-state distribution and total supply to be efficient. In general, this condition is not satisfied in equilibrium, implying that policy competition between states leads to sub optimality in the supply and distribution of mobile factors, except in the special case of full integration.
What we have is "over" or "under" provision (we cannot in general say which) of the mobile factor to the region and an inefficient inter-state distribution. This seems to be a new notion in this literature: that the supply of the mobile factor that results from a game between states in which each adopts competitive self-serving behavior, leads to a sub optimal supply of the mobile factor (capital or labor) to the regional union, be it a federation or confederation. The sub optimality, related to the mobile factor itself, is a source of inefficiency that is in addition to any inefficiency arising from provision of the public good, the issue already examined in the literature. Its identification is a consequence of exploring a model structure in which monopoly power gives states the ability to choose non-zero tax/subsidies. 13 Recall from Section 3.2 that the equilibrium is also unique in this case.
Conclusion
There is a class of model in which states within regional unions choose policies directed towards migrating factors of production. We have extended this model by allowing the total supply of the mobile factor to the region to be determined by a function that allows the regional mobile factor payoff to differ from the world payoff in equilibrium (due to imperfect mobility). We have also modeled the total supply of the mobile factor to each state, and the region as a whole, as being the result of competitive optimizing decisions made by member states (ie., total factor supply is endogenous).
This is quite different to the approach of say, Wellisch and Wildasin, who model states making policy decisions conditional on some given supply of the migrant factor.
The paper contains a number of new results. In particular, we have demonstrated existence of Nash equilibria by showing that the game in two strategic variables has a dual game in which each state finds the policy combination that minimizes the cost of achieving its desired supply of the mobile factor. It has not been possible to show uniqueness, however, except for the special case where the regional and world factor markets are fully integrated, and states must offer a payoff to the mobile factor that equals its world return. In the more general case of imperfect mobility between the region and the world, there is the possibility of multiple Nash equilibria.
We also show that it is optimal in equilibrium for states to levy non-zero taxes or subsidies on the mobile factor. As noted, this differs from existing findings where optimality usually requires a zero tax/subsidy. One reason for the difference is that our factor supply condition allows states, when there is imperfect mobility between the region and the world, to have monopoly power over the migrating factor. This creates incentives to exploit the factor and redistribute in favor of the domestic residents, who control the local polity. The non-zero tax/subsidy also leads to sub optimality in the total supply and inter-state distribution of the mobile factor except in the case of full integration.
